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TUCoPS :: Cisco :: b06-3570.htm

Cisco Router Web Setup Ships with Insecure Default IOS Configuration

Better a bottle in front of me than a frontal lobotomy.

Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Router Web Setup Ships with Insecure Default IOS Configuration
Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Router Web Setup Ships with Insecure Default IOS Configuration



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Cisco Security Advisory: 
Cisco Router Web Setup Ships with Insecure Default IOS Configuration

Document ID: 70650

Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20060712-crws

http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060712-crws.shtml 

Revision 1.0

For Public Release 2006 July 12 1600 UTC (GMT)

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Contents
=======
    Summary
    Affected Products
    Details
    Impact
    Software Version and Fixes
    Workarounds
    Obtaining Fixed Software
    Exploitation and Public Announcements
    Status of this Notice: FINAL
    Distribution
    Revision History
    Cisco Security Procedures

- -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary
======
The default Cisco IOS configuration shipped with the Cisco Router Web
Setup (CRWS) application allows the execution of commands at privilege
level 15 through the Cisco IOS HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol)
server web interface without requiring authentication credentials.
Privilege level 15 is the highest privilege level on Cisco IOS?
devices.

Fixed versions of the CRWS application have been modified by Cisco to
provide a more secure default IOS configuration and additional
functionality with regards to the Cisco IOS HTTP server web interface.

This issue does not require a Cisco IOS software upgrade or a CRWS
software upgrade. Customers who decide to upgrade to a fixed version of
CRWS and deploy the new default IOS configuration will not need to
deploy the suggested workarounds. Customers who elect NOT to upgrade to
a fixed CRWS version, or customers upgrading to a fixed CRWS version
who keep their existing configuration should implement the workarounds
identified in this advisory.

Additional information on the new default IOS configuration shipped
with the CRWS application is available in the Details section of this
advisory.

This advisory is posted at 
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060712-crws.shtml. 

Affected Products
================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------

The following Cisco routers whose configurations have been based on the
default IOS configuration shipped with any version of CRWS prior to
version 3.3.0 build 31 may be affected by this vulnerability:

  * Cisco 806
  * Cisco 826
  * Cisco 827
  * Cisco 827H
  * Cisco 827-4v
  * Cisco 828
  * Cisco 831
  * Cisco 836
  * Cisco 837
  * Cisco SOHO 71
  * Cisco SOHO 76
  * Cisco SOHO 77
  * Cisco SOHO 77H
  * Cisco SOHO 78
  * Cisco SOHO 91
  * Cisco SOHO 96
  * Cisco SOHO 97

Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------

Any of the previously listed Cisco routers whose IOS configuration is
not based on the default IOS configuration shipped with the CRWS
application are not vulnerable.

No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this
vulnerability.

Details
======
The Cisco Router Web Setup tool (CRWS) provides a graphical user
interface (GUI) for configuring Cisco SOHO and Cisco 800 series
routers, and allows users to set up their routers quickly and easily.
The GUI is accessed through the Cisco IOS HTTP server, which is enabled
on the default IOS configuration shipped with the CRWS application.

The Cisco IOS HTTP server uses the "enable password" (assuming one has
been configured) as its default authentication mechanism. Other
authentication mechanisms can be configured, including the use of a
local user database, an external RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In
User Service) or an external TACACS+ (Terminal Access Controller Access
Control System) server. The default IOS configuration shipped with the
CRWS application does not include an "enable password" or an "enable
secret" command, allowing access to the Cisco IOS HTTP server interface
at any privilege level, up to and including privilege level 15, without
providing authentication credentials. Privilege level 15 is the highest
privilege level on Cisco IOS devices.

To resolve this vulnerability, Cisco has made changes to the default
IOS configuration shipped with the CRWS application and to the CRWS
application itself. Those changes are as follows:

  * The addition of a default username and password combination to be
    used during initial device configuration.

    Note:  CRWS will prompt the user to change those default
    credentials during its first invocation. It is strongly recommended
    for customers to remove those default credentials from the device
    configuration by using the Cisco IOS CLI (command line interface)
    if not planning to use the CRWS application for device
    configuration.

  * The addition of an authentication mechanism for the Cisco IOS HTTP
    server to authenticate users based on the local user database.

  * The addition of an access restriction to only allow connections to
    the Cisco IOS HTTP server from the internal network, using the
    addressing schema from the default IOS configuration shipped with
    CRWS.

  * The addition of a login banner, displayed on connections to the
    device through Telnet or the console port, reminding users to
    remove the default credentials.

  * The addition of an authentication mechanism to the console port to
    authenticate users based on the local user database.

  * A modification to the CRWS application to force users to change the
    default credentials the first time they access the CRWS GUI.

  * A modification to the CRWS application to allow users to enable or
    disable access to the IOS HTTP server interface from the public
    interface.

This vulnerability is documented by the following Cisco bug ID:

  * CSCsa78190 

Note:  Implementation of the available workarounds require manual
configuration to mitigate the impact of this vulnerability for existing
CRWS customers, even if upgrading to a fixed version of software.

Devices using CRWS for configuration and management are affected by
this vulnerability if the following conditions are met:

  * The current device configuration is based on the default IOS
    configuration shipped with the CRWS application, and

  * the Cisco IOS HTTP server, which is enabled in the default IOS
    configuration shipped with CRWS, has not been disabled by the user,
    and

  * no additional authentication mechanism (for example, local user
    database, RADIUS, TACACS+) has been defined for access to the IOS
    HTTP server, or no "enable password" or "enable secret" is present in
    the configuration.

The following procedure can be used to determine if a given device is
vulnerable:

1. Is the Cisco IOS HTTP server enabled on the device?

  * YES - Proceed to step 2.
  * NO - The device is not vulnerable.

2. Is there an authentication mechanism configured for access to the
IOS HTTP server interface?

  * YES - The device is not vulnerable.
  * NO - Proceed to step 3.

3. Is there an "enable password" or an "enable secret" configured on the
device?

  * YES - The device is not vulnerable.
  * NO - The device is vulnerable. Please read the Software Versions and
    Fixes section and the Workarounds sections of this security
    advisory.

The following step-by-step procedure can be used in order to obtain the
information needed to answer the questions in the previous procedure:

 1. In order to determine if the Cisco IOS HTTP server is enabled on
    the device, execute the following command from a privileged CLI
    prompt:

        show running-config | include ip http


    The following example shows a device on which the Cisco IOS HTTP
    server is enabled:

        Router#show running-config | include ip http
        ip http server
        Router#


    The following example shows a device on which the Cisco IOS HTTP
    server is disabled:

        Router#show running-config | include ip http
        no ip http server
        Router#


    Note:  Newer versions of the Cisco IOS HTTP server provide SSL
    (Secure Sockets Layer) encryption. This vulnerability can also be
    exploited if the SSL-enabled Cisco IOS HTTP server is enabled on
    the configuration. The following example shows a device on which
    the standard Cisco IOS HTTP server is disabled, but the SSL-enabled
    Cisco IOS HTTP server is enabled:

        Router#show running-config | include ip http
        no ip http server
        ip http secure-server
        Router#


 2. In order to determine if an authentication mechanism has been
    applied to the Cisco IOS HTTP server, execute the following command
    from a privileged CLI prompt:

        show running-config | include ip http


    The following example shows a device on which the Cisco IOS HTTP
    server is enabled and the local authentication mechanism has been
    configured:

        Router#show running-config | include ip http
        ip http server
        ip http authentication local
        no ip http secure-server
        Router#


    The absence of an "ip http authentication" line on the device
    configuration implies that the Cisco IOS HTTP server will use the
    "enable secret" or "enable password" (if so configured) as the
    authentication mechanism. Additional information on AAA mechanisms
    available for the Cisco IOS HTTP server can be found in the
    document entitled "AAA Control of the IOS HTTP Server", available at 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk59/technologies_tech_note09186a008069bdc5.shtml . 

 3. In order to determine if an "enable password" or "enable secret" has
    been configured, execute the following command from a privileged
    CLI prompt:

        show running-config | include enable [secret|password]


    The following example shows a device on which an "enable secret"
    password has been configured:

        Router#show running-config | include enable [secret|password]
        enable secret 5 $1$1yfp$qM7qAChXVXYp8ee2qm2Kf/
        Router#


    The following example shows a device on which no "enable password" or
    "enable secret" has been configured:

        Router#show running-config | include enable [secret|password]
        Router#


Impact
=====
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow for the
execution of commands on the device at any privilege level, up to and
including privilege level 15. Accessing the device at privilege level
15 would enable total control of the device, including but not limited
to device configuration changes and device reloading.

Software Version and Fixes
=========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult 
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to 
determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.

In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.

This issue is fixed for new installations in CRWS version 3.3.0 build
31, which is available at 
http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/crws 

Information about how to install CRWS version 3.3.0 build 31 can be
found at 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/netmgtsw/ps2076/prod_troubleshooting_guide09186a0080132c3c.html#1080818 

Existing CRWS users or customers upgrading to CRWS version 3.3.0 build
31 from any previous version should deploy the workarounds mentioned in
the Workarounds section of this security advisory. Upgrading the CRWS
software on the device from a previous version to a fixed software
version will not eliminate the vulnerability for existing
installations.

Workarounds
==========
There are multiple workarounds to mitigate this vulnerability. Existing
CRWS customers, and customers upgrading to a new CRWS version from a
previous one, should deploy one of the following workarounds if
vulnerable to this issue. Upgrading to a new CRWS version is not enough
to eliminate this vulnerability.

  * Workaround 1 - Disabling the Cisco IOS HTTP Server Functionality

    Customers not using the CRWS application to configure or manage
    their devices and not needing the functionality provided by the
    Cisco IOS HTTP server can disable it by adding the following
    commands to their device configuration:

        no ip http server
        no ip http secure-server


    The second command might return an error message if the Cisco IOS
    version installed and running on the device does not support the
    SSL functionality. This error message is harmless and can be safely
    ignored.

  * Workaround 2 - Enabling Authentication of Requests to the Cisco IOS
    HTTP Server by Configuring an Enable Password

    Customers using the CRWS application to configure or manage their
    devices, or requiring the functionality provided by the Cisco IOS
    HTTP server must configure an authentication mechanism for access
    to the Cisco IOS HTTP server interface. One of those options is to
    configure an "enable secret" or "enable password" password. The "enable
    password" is the default authentication mechanism used by the Cisco
    IOS HTTP server if no other method has been configured.

    In order to configure an "enable secret" password, add the following
    command to the device configuration:

        enable secret 


    Replace  with a strong password of your choosing. For
    guidance on strong passwords, please refer to your site security
    policy. The document entitled "Cisco IOS Password Encryption
    Facts", available at 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk59/technologies_tech_note09186a00801d7efa.shtml 
    explains the differences between the "enable secret" and the "enable 
    password" commands.

  * Workaround 3 - Enabling Authentication of Requests to the Cisco IOS
    HTTP Server by using an Authentication Mechanism Other than the
    Default

    Configure an authentication mechanism for access to the Cisco IOS
    HTTP server other than the default. Such authentication mechanisms
    can be the local user database, or a previously defined AAA
    (Authentication, Authorization and Accounting) method. As the
    procedure to enable an authentication mechanism for the Cisco IOS
    HTTP server varies across Cisco IOS releases and other additional
    factors, no example will be provided. Customers looking for
    information about how to configure an authentication mechanism for
    the Cisco IOS HTTP server are encouraged to read the document
    entitled "AAA Control of the IOS HTTP Server", available at 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk59/technologies_tech_note09186a008069bdc5.shtml. 

    Note: The only authentication method tested and supported for use
    with the CRWS application is the local user database. No other
    methods (including the use of an external RADIUS or TACACS+ server)
    are supported.

In addition to those workarounds, it is highly recommended that
customers limit access to their Cisco IOS HTTP server to only trusted
management workstations. Information on how to restrict access to the
Cisco IOS HTTP server based on IP addresses can be found at 
http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/software/ios122/122cgcr/ffun_c/ffcprt1/fcf005.htm#1000973. 

Obtaining Fixed Software
=======================
Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability
for affected customers. This advisory will be updated as fixed software
becomes available. Prior to deploying software, customers should
consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature
set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.

Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they
have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise
using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms
of Cisco's software license terms found at 
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html , or as otherwise 
set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at 
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. 

Do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or "security-alert@cisco.com" 
for software upgrades.

Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------

Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com . 

Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------

Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as
Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the
appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.

The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.

Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------

Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors
but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of
sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical
Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.

  * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
  * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com 

Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades
for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.

Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml 
for additional TAC contact information, including special localized
telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in
various languages.

Exploitation and Public Announcements
====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.

This vulnerability was discovered during internal testing.

Status of this Notice: FINAL
===========================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT
YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.

A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled
copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.

Distribution
===========
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at 
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060712-crws.shtml 

In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.

* cust-security-announce@cisco.com 
* first-teams@first.org 
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com 
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org 
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu 
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net 
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk 
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com 

Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.

Revision History
===============
+----------------------------------------+
| Revision | 2006 July 12  | Initial     |
| 1.0      | 1600 UTC      | public      |
|          | (GMT)         | release     |
+----------------------------------------+

Cisco Security Procedures
========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering
to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's
worldwide website at 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. 
This includes instructions
for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco
security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. 

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All contents are Copyright 1992-2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights
reserved. 

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Updated: Jul 12, 2006                                Document ID: 70650

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